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THE AIRLINES' DISPUTE 
WAGES DETERMINATION OR UNION EXTERMINAION
Before I say more it is important that I introduce you to a pilot and share a little, perhaps 
of my background and training so you may properly understand pilots in Australia.
At a very early age, in my case thirteen, I decided that I wanted to be a pilot. I suppose 
that is good in a way. While it does not make school any easier it helps to know what you are 
doing it for.
You spend much of your leisure time buying and reading books and magazines on 
aviation, making models and generally being where aeroplanes and aviators are.
The next major step in becoming a pilot is to be prepared to back yourself, and invest 
about $30,000 (in today’s terms) in your training. In my case that meant my parents putting a 
second mortgage on their house and me repaying that loan. I will always remember $111 per 
month for five and a half years.
It is worth noting that to get a start, these young people have to invest a very large sum 
in their own industry. A genuine test of their dedication, that they make in that early 
commitment.
Some pilots go through the military system where they commit themselves to a lengthy 
period of return service. In my case I did both - paying to learn to fly at Cessnock, New South 
Wales and then, after a time in General Aviation, flying in the Army for five and a half years.
The salary paid to pilots in those early years is very low. In fact it is generally where 
they first meet the Federation* , the pilots’ union. General Aviation is tough, and in order to 
gain an unfair advantage, some operators will not pay the proper award salary, and also try to 
force pilots to break the rules of safety. Hopefully those operators are becoming the minority 
and will continue to be or better still, disappear forever.
The Federation acts not only as the pilots’ friend and union but also as the best 
insurance policy the pilots and their passengers have.
Australian Federation o f Air Pilots (AFAP)
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The expertise that pilots provide to their industry through the Federation, was of even 
greater value as those pilots gained experience in General Aviation and moved on to the 
Airlines.
The AFAP is one of the few unions in which the officials, all pilots, are elected by the 
members. They are not paid. The pilots run their own union.
Australian pilots through their Federation were highly regarded for their work and 
achievements in world aviation safety, security and all technical matters. This input is 
channelled through the International Federation of Air Line Pilots’ Association (IFALPA) 
through the many International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) panels and many safety 
organisations, world wide.
In the industrial area, pilots through their Federation were and will continue to be, 
leaders and innovators. Much is talked in union circles of industrial democracy, training and of 
course superannuation.
In the latter, pilots had negotiated salary offsets for superannuation years ago. Our 
schemes were all fully funded and we had elected pilot members as trustees of the funds. In 
General Aviation we had, and still have a fund that provides for portability of super. The fund 
also provides for licensed maintenance engineers and has a great deal of input from their union. 
We are partners.
Pilots had negotiated consent agreements for decades. Because of the very high 
standards required for initial issue and renewal of licences, we had a seniority system that 
provided a career path. That career path, or seniority system is recognised by every reputable 
airline in the world and replaced the “promotion of favourites” system that plagued the 
profession of pilot in Australia in the 1950s and 1960s.
Seniority had its responsibilities. It only ever offered an opportunity to qualify, and in 
the promotion to Captain, REQUIRED that a pilot take that opportunity. If I had not met the 
standard required for my B727 command status, that I achieved after fourteen years in the 
airline and a five month training period, I was out of a job. I stress, I could not have gone back 
to duties as an Airbus First Officer, I was out of the airline.
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I do not know of any other job or profession that demanded such a high standard of 
entry and a continued assessment.
Pilots and the Federation were also leaders in providing a high level of industrial 
democracy within their contracts. The companies would provide us with the work or flying 
patterns to be performed, and our scheduling committees would build that flying into blocks of 
monthly work for pilots to perform It was not unusual for many pilots to achieve a balanced 
preference for work and days off with their families. It was not perfect, but importantly the 
pilots had a say and a choice.
Before I move onto the Dispute I must explain the effect the Two Airline Policy, the 
agreement between the Government and the Airlines, had on airline scheduling and the numbers 
of pilots required.
Capacity control limited each airline to a certain number of passenger seats over each 
route. If all seats were occupied it was fine, but the airlines were penalised as empty seats still 
counted towards capacity. Australian Airlines, for example would have operated the Airbus 
A300 as a night freighter between Perth and the east coast, but that seating “above the cargo 
compartment” would have subsequently reduced their passenger capacity.
Because of capacity controls the airlines adopted a practice called load factor control, or 
cancellation/substitution as it affected pilots.
If a 240 seat Airbus was scheduled to operate and the loadings were low, they would 
cancel the Airbus and put on a smaller capacity aircraft. This created a cost in reserve crews 
and of course a great disruption to the working lives of pilots and their families. This, and pilot 
training is the explanation for the “low average” hours quoted by the airlines and Government 
during the dispute. The companies and the Government tried to blame pilots or their ‘awards’ 
for a management policy and commercial decisions that were either wrong, administered 
incompetently, or both.
Australia is the only country in the world operating this scheduling system. If the 
airlines and Government had compared apples with apples and Australian domestic block 
holder flight and duty hours with domestic pilots in other countries, it would have shown
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Australian pilots with a lot of stick hours” per month and also Australian pilot duty hours to be 
some of the highest in the world.
Further to this, if the airlines had approached the Federation with a proposition for 
greater productivity and a subsequent requirement for fewer pilots, due to the abandonment of 
their grossly inefficient practice of demand scheduling it would not only have been accepted, 
but would have been enthusiastically endorsed by the pilots and their negotiators.
As a leader and innovator the Federation was always aware of the forces of change 
within our industry and had therefore taken a great interest in the privatisation debate.
The pilots’ first point, was that the Labor party did not own Australian Airlines, the 
people of Australia did. As the custodians, the Government was responsible for its 
management. Part of that responsibility was the proper and adequate funding. The Pilots’ 
Federation made many presentations to the various committees of enquiry into the running, or 
possible privatisation of TAA or AAL. I believe that at all levels our input was of the highest 
standard, and a study of presentations and final reports of those committees will confirm this.
Just prior to the airline dispute we were in the process of sharing three years of very 
time consuming and costly research with all other unions, AAL management and the ACTU.
We estimated that AAL required the immediate injection of at least $300M. If the 
Government did not wish to provide the capital it should allow outside investment.
We further proposed that all staff should be given the opportunity to invest. Not a 
gratuitous 9%, but at a level determined by their willingness to invest. If they only wanted 9% 
or less, then so be it. But, if they were prepared and able to invest more, then they should be 
encouraged to do so.
Some Trades and Labor Councils I spoke to at the height of the continuing dispute felt 
the pilots’ open approach to AAL funding might have also inspired some of the hostility 
towards us. I can say that the Government, senior management and the board seemed 
particularly uneasy with the prospect of the greater staff responsibility and knowledge of the 
running of the airline that would have naturally flowed to the staff, from a significant employee 
share plan.
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In fact, a good look at the books now would certainly be in order. It is interesting to 
see how much the Auditor General’s report on the “State of Victoria” varies from what our 
politicians responsible for its management would have us believe.
Our assessment that the airline needed an injection of $300M in early 1989 would, 
because of the huge costs the airlines were prepared to expend on the destruction of the 
Federation, be merely a down payment.
It will also be interesting to see who lines up for a slice of AAL, and if someone does, 
should the money paid then go to the airline to pay off their dispute, or go back to the original 
owners, the people of Australia? Please think about it.
While you are thinking about it, I will summarise five years of a twenty year contract 
negotiation practice.
Pilots employed by the major domestic airlines have, since the early seventies 
successfully negotiated two-year Agreements with very little recourse to industrial action:
In 1985 the TAA pilots last negotiated a two-year agreement. In 1986 Ansett and East- 
West pilots concluded separate agreements with their companies.
In 1987 TAA was in a poor economic position and the pilots decided not to press a 
negotiation on a new agreement in the hope that the company’s fortunes would improve.
In 1988, Ansett pilots met with their company and were told that there would be no 
agreement as “Industry Negotiations would be required”. However, without recourse to 
industrial action they were successful in reaching an agreement with improvements in both 
productivity and remuneration. Subsequently, East-West pilots met with their company, by 
then also owned by TNT/NEWS and reached agreement with similar improvements. This was 
the time of Australia’s Bi-Centenary and The World Expo in Brisbane. Australian Aviation was 
expanding along with world trends, particularly in the South West Pacific Region. Travel and 
tourism in Australia had replaced wool as our number one export earner.
In June, 1989, therefore, with Australian Airlines position improved, the company just 
having announced a record profit, the Australian Airlines pilots met with their management to 
negotiate their first agreement for four years. They were currently working extended overtime, 
for no salary benefit, to assist in the Boeing B737-300 introduction following a serious
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miscalculation by management, who had planned a training programme many months behind 
the aircraft introduction.
The Australian pilots DID have bona fide expectations of improving their remuneration 
through productivity, just as Ansett and East-West pilots had in both 1986 and 1988.
The Ansett pilots which now included Ease-West Airlines, were well ahead in salary of 
the Australian Airlines pilots.
The AFAP drew up a Log of Claims and scheduled a week’s “lock in” with AAL. This 
could have led to the evolution of a new contract over a three year period. The pilots were 
prepared to look at significant savings for the company through streamlined training and 
computerised rostering.
A significant element of the log was that the AAL pilots’ log claimed less for non 
scheduled overtime, or drafting as pilots knew it, than the actual amount, then currently paid by 
Ansett to its pilots.
The Australian Airlines pilots claimed less than the Ansett pilots were receiving!
Australian Airlines flatly refused to negotiate even though minutes of meetings reflect 
that considerably more productivity was offered by the Australian pilots than the Ansett and 
East-West settlements allowed. Australian Airlines demanded “Industry Negotiations.” The 
Australian Airlines contract thus became the catalyst for the Airlines Dispute.
Because of the failure of Australian Airlines to manage its own negotiations as Ansett 
and East-West had been able or allowed to do less than twelve months prior, the Federation 
was left only the “industry” alternative as dictated by Ansett.
Since pilot contracts differ in many ways, because of the make up and operations of 
each airline, it was not practicable to serve each airline with a separate industry log.
The Federation determined a pay demand of 29.47% and served this on the industry on 
the 26th July, 1989.
This amount was calculated by going back over a period from 1984/85 to June, 1989. 
During this period pilot salaries had slipped behind the cost of living by 23% for Captains and 
21% for First Officers. We then compounded 7% for inflation to cover the year 1989/90.
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I and all pilots were aware that the wages and salaries of all people covered by the 
“accords” had slipped. In fact the Government statements argued that the accord had 
redistributed income from salaries to corporate profits.
The Federation look at other professions or groups that we had been compared to in 
wage cases over the years - politicians, judges and professional engineers. We had watched 
executive salaries in the same period increase by 54%.
It was quite obvious, apart from corporate profits, including the airlines, that those 
doing best out of the “accord” were those who were not in it.
In the letter of claim we sought a series of meetings to discuss our claim and those 
meetings took place in the first week of August, 1989.
These August “industry” meetings now introduced the trigger for a dispute. The 
airlines, having got their industry meeting, now demanded a pre-condition to any negotiations. 
Unless the Federation committed to the new guide lines, there would be no negotiation.s
Compare this to the ACTU who now declare the AIRC “irrelevant” in their push for 
Accord Mark VI and its productivity package.
In very early August, 1989, the only thing that had been negotiated was the guidelines 
themselves, but between the Government and the ACTU. They were not public and yet to be 
ratified by the Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC). It was an impossible 
demand and an approach obviously designed to inflame a very volatile situation.
When the guidelines were announced by the AIRC on the 7th August, another problem 
was immediately created. The ACTU, one of the principal architects, declared some aspects of 
the guidelines incomprehensible, and that they were not prepared to commit to a set of 
guidelines they did not fully comprehend.
I could not agree more!
The ACTU were then allowed to negotiate with their five main employer groups, five 
test cases before they would give their commitment.
In contrast, the AFAP was told that no talks or negotiations could proceed whatsoever, 
until we had given our formal commitment to the new guidelines.
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The attitudes of the companies (and the Government) meant that negotiations relevant to 
our industry, which could have led to salary increases and productivity, potentially justifiable 
under the guidelines, could not take place.
In fact, we had told the companies we were prepared to work within the Industrial 
Relations Act and have any subsequent settlement tested against the guidelines.
With the benefit of hindsight it is apparent that the insistence on the guidelines by Ansett 
was put in such a smug fashion that rather than assist a conciliation, it was an invitation to an 
industrial response.
From the 9th August, 1989 the pace of events accelerated apparent in a series of 
statements by the Government and the Prime Minister. Meetings between Government, the 
companies and the ACTU seemed to follow a path that was aimed at the destruction of the 
AFAP.
In a statement by Mr. Hawke in the mid seventies during another airline dispute, he was 
reminding the Labor Government that in the 1972 and 1974 elections the ALP espoused the 
policy of allowing the “uninhibited process of collective negotiations” between employers and 
employees. The Government’s role in disputes, Hawke believed, was to assist in settling them 
but the attitudes of some ministers were only exacerbating the situation.
In August, 1990, the Minister for Industrial Relations, Senator Cook, commenting on 
the refuellers’ strike said, “the important point is that the umpire, in this case the Commission, 
should be given the proper scope to do its job and shouldn’t be doing its job in a situation in 
which the Government is issuing demands intervening over its shoulder or interfering with the 
management of that dispute.”
In October, 1990, during the fuel strike the ACTU, in talking of the insertion of a bans 
clause said unions opposed the bans clause, and warned the action could “inflame the dispute 
rather than solve it.
Having jogged our memories with quotes, both old and new, what were the statements 






• airline companies request a hearing before the Commission. Our claim is 
described as “outrageous”, yet we have not even had the opportunity to put a 
case.
• 95% of pilots who were able to attend stop work meetings held around 
Australia voted by secret ballot in support negotiations without preconditions.
In the AIRC, the Government representative initiates the question of the 
cancellation of awards by stating, “....the Government will support any move 
for the cancellation or the suspension of the agreements relating to the terms 
and conditions of employment of pilots.”
The Prime Minister convenes a meeting of Ministers and airline 
chairmen.
Pilots begin a campaign to work between the hours of 9am and 5pm. 
(i.e. 8 hours a day, 7 days a week).
• Such industrial action aims to bring on a negotiation with the airlines.
• Such work limitations allow the system to continue to operate. All 
employees in the aviation, travel and tourist industry can maintain 
employment. All people who wish to travel, can. (AAL reported all 
passengers who wished to travel over the weekend 19/20 August were able to 
do so)
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The companies follow the Government lead of 15th August and make 
application for the cancellation of pilot awards in the AIRC at 10.06am. The 
proceedings are adjourned at 11.39am until 1530pm before a Full Bench of 
five members.
The Airlines are represented by legal counsel, who state that the companies are 
committed to the “dispute resolution procedure set out in the Industrial Relations Act”. If that 
was so, one would have expected them to use that procedure, and seek a bans clause.
The fact is, according to a senior airline official in an address on their dispute - the 
option of seeking a bans clause was considered but rejected because of the time delay in the 
processes of a Presidential Member inserting the clause, then issuing a certificate for 
prosecutions after the clause was breached, and then the COMMISSION EXERCISING ITS 
DUTY TO SEEK TO RESOLVE THE DISPUTE. Perhaps such delays, albeit a nuisance for 
some, are there for a reason and a purpose.
He went on to explain that the cancellation was not primarily conceived as a means of 
forcing pilots back to work. The cancellation allowed the airlines to redraw the pilots’ contracts 
on terms favourable to the employers, and required pilots to seek remedies in the civil courts as 
their terms and conditions of employment would be no longer covered by any award of the 
Commission.
The AFAP received an anonymous call on the afternoon of the 18th August, 1989, to 
say the word from the ACTU is that your awards will be cancelled by close of business today.
I can certainly recall my feelings at the time.
I dearly wanted the Commission to see the belligerent and smug arrogant stance the 
companies took in the supposed “conciliation conferences”.
• First, one airline couldn't make decisions on and of its own;
next it was “industry negotiations”;
• then, commit to guidelines, yet to be announced;
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then, it was commit before any negotiations (unlike the ACTU, who were 
allowed prior negotiations).
• I am certain, that if we had agreed to a commitment there would have been 
another, and yet another demand to be fulfilled.
However, whilst sitting in the Commission I was appalled at what I saw as a denial of 
natural justice and the unseemly haste which this most important matter was being dealt with. It 
was break neck speed. And for what? So that the AIRC, instead of maintaining control could 
have it all neady and cleanly taken out of its hands.
When asked by the Commission “what are the possible steps that might follow in 
relation to this matter, should we accede to your request to cancel the awards”, the airlines 
counsel replied, “Clearly the steps that follow this are going to be serious and carefully 
considered ones .... I am not in the position to advise the commission precisely what the 
companies will be proceeding to do if this application is granted,” and they never did.
In fact the President of the Commission insisted “that I would need to be satisfied that 
we are not involved in some paper exercise”.
In reply the airlines counsel stated that the “awards being cancelled will mean that the
pilots will remain employed, further that the terms and conditions will be as per those set
out in those awards”.
It is obvious, and it should have been to the Commission at the time, that it was a 
“paper exercise”, and the AIRC were merely facilitating the companies’ desire to destroy the 
Federation. They allowed themselves to be dealt out of the dispute at a critical and decisive 
time.
Compare the action and response of the Commission and the ACTU then and now (in 
late 1990) in the continuing strike of 700 workers at the ESSO Victoria installations:-
• Oil industry unions call on the company, ESSO to negotiate a settlement to the 
four week dispute;
• The AIRC have inserted bans clause in the awards of the striking workers’
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• ACTU secretary, Bill Kelty warns that if one worker received a fine, the whole 
oil industry would face “nothing but industrial action”.
At 4pm on the 21st August 1989, various awards of the commission were cancelled. 
Among awards cancelled were:
• East-West Airlines (Operations) Limited Consolidated Seniority Award 1982;
• Seniority (East-West and Northern Airlines) Award 1980;
• Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd Integration Award 1988;
• Airlines Pilots’ Long Service Leave Award (1968);
• Air Queensland Pilots’ Agreements 1984;
• TAA - Air Queensland Pilots' Award 1985.
These seven awards covered pilots not even involved in the dispute or taking industrial
action.
Having now removed the AIRC from the dispute, the airlines continued their attack on 
the pilots and their Federation.
I now again refer to that senior airline official’s address.
He mentioned that during August, 1989, a team of Australian and Ansett management 
representatives worked full time on the dispute. Two or three representatives from Freehill 
Hollingdale and Page were also present.
This group, now expanded to include the ACTU, met during the day in the offices of 
AAL (because, he explained, the morning, afternoon tea and lunch facilities were better) and in
the evening in the offices of Ansett. This was because officials of the ACTU, frequently in
attendance, felt more comfortable in the Ansett offices. This was partly because the former 
ACTU industrial officer with responsibility for the airline industry had moved to Ansett, and 
had responsibility for its campaign.
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This group of employers, lawyers and current and former ACTU officials met 
constantly to discuss their options to defeat the pilots’ union.
If I take you back to Sunday 20th and Monday 21st August, 1989. The Prime Minister, 
Mr. Hawke, when talking about the airlines strategy said, “We have discussed the contingency 
plans that will be pursued by the airlines, i.e., the adoption of legal processes against individual 
pilots and their organisation, which processes will carry significant penalties for individual 
pilots and for the Federation.”
“I say without equivocation, that when the airlines decide to initiate those legal 
processes with significantly very drastic financial penalties against individual pilots and their 
organisation, the airlines will be pursuing those legal processes with the full support of my 
Government.”
It is well known that Labour and unions have always opposed the imposition of fines as 
that most recent quote (noted above) over the oil industry dispute from the ACTU that “nothing 
but industrial action” would follow. However, the issuing of writs against individual workers, 
union officials and staff is anathema to the Labour movement. You could imagine, therefore 
my consternation in the aforementioned airline official’s address, when he had referred to the 
individual writs against pilots as a tactic to be used to put pressure on the pilots’ families.
Well I can assure you it did. So much so that it forced their resignations on 24th 
August, 1989.
But, why did the pilots resign?
Flying aeroplanes is about safety and responsibility. Pilots are very responsible and at 
all times concerned about the safety and well-being of their aircraft and passengers.
If something was to occur during a flight that placed the safety of the passengers at risk 
and a decision involved a choice to either continue or take a course of action that included some 
risk, or to take another course, albeit detrimental to the pilot, but offering guaranteed safety for 
his or her passengers, the Captain will take the decision which guarantees safety.
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The writs placed the pilot’s family and all assets - home, life savings, superannuation,
at risk. The Federation sought legal advice. Pilots had two options:-
To place in jeopardy the family home, life savings and superannuation and continue in 
the hope that the airlines and the Government might change their attitude, which I might 
add, they haven’t , or,
• To guarantee the safety of his family assets, and resign.
Resignation was very detrimental to the pilot. The award was cancelled, only the 
contract remained. But 1600 individual pilots took the decision that all pilots would take when 
the safety of those they are responsible for are placed in danger. They resigned to guarantee the 
safety of those for whom they felt responsible.
But just prior to this the Prime Minister, Mr. Hawke, had declared war on the pilots, 
“You go out and it’s war” he said, and the airlines started standing down pilots and suing them
• A pilot on long term sick leave was stood down;
• A crew half way across the Great Australian Bight was advised by radio of their stand
down.
The Airlines threw writs around like confetti.
• A pilot was sued for not operating a flight from Sydney to Brisbane at 2.20pm 
(incidentally he was not asked to operate the flight) but it was academic anyway as he was 
operating a service Brisbane/Sydney at 1.10pm followed by Sydney/Adelaide at 3.00pm.
• But the most disgraceful of all was the issuing of a writ against a Captain for not 
operating an unserviceable aircraft. That pilot, his wife and family are now living in Saudi 
Arabia. A war zone from which Australian families are being evacuated but one which pilots 
and their families are being forced to go to because of the Government’s war on pilots and their 
families.
During this time Mr. Hawke continued to pour more oil on the fire by calling pilots “bus 
drivers”. I was never quite sure what the bus drivers had done wrong. He then advised
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Australia that it only takes seven hours to learn to fly. If that is the case, every airline pilot in 
Australia, and indeed in the world has wasted tens of thousands of dollars.
Then, in one of the most amazing statements of ridicule I have ever heard from a 
politician, diplomat, labour or union official that “these blokes even enjoy their job.”
I am not here to add further criticism to the public and private role of Mr. Hawke, but 
quite plainly if he had kept out of it, if the AIRC had not allowed itself to be shunted out at a 
critical time, and if the ACTU had spent time in genuine and honest face to face discussions 
with the Federation. ( and not advising the airlines), I have no doubt the dispute would have 
been resolved, fairly and quickly.
That of course is history but what is also history is the Federation’s attempts to bring on 
a proper resolution to the dispute.
The pilots’ attempt to bring proper resolution to the dispute.
On the 6th September, 1989, pilots offered to return to work 9 to 5 if a genuine 
negotiation could commence.
On the 12th September, 1989, we offered to return to work full time while genuine 
negotiations took place.
On the 17th September, 1989, we proposed Sir Lawrence Street, the former chief 
justice of the NSW Supreme Court as an independent mediator.
While all these offers were being made, the companies, in rejection were saying - we 
can’t have these people back, they will only go out on strike again. What rubbish!
On 4-6th October, 1989, having heard for the first time an explanation, before the 
AIRC, of the companies’ proposed contracts, the Federation made the following 
proposal, in the AIRC, to the President, Mr. Justice Maddem:
The AFAP: • withdrew our 29.47% claim;
• accepted the offer of pay for productivity contained in the
companies’ contracts;
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• asked for conciliation and arbitration by the most senior 
industrial regulator in Australia, namely the President of the 
AIRC.
• Further, the Federation would waive our right under section 105 
of the Act which would allow the President of the Commission 
to Arbitrate should Conciliation fail.
I will never know why this proposal to the AIRC to resolve the dispute was not 
accepted. It, to my mind, was the date the dispute should have ended and the Commission 
could have been seen to be responsible, and keep a hands-on role to ensure the Airlines’ 
Disputes proper resolution.
The Commission gave no real reason why it would not take a hands-on role in the 
conciliation process, save but to say “we are not prepared to order a compulsory conference 
against the wishes of the employers, whilst the AFAP maintains its bans on employment with 
the companies concerned”.
On the 27th October, 1989, the Federation offered a return to work by all pilots on pre­
dispute conditions so that all services could return to work for Christmas. A cooling off period 
would follow with negotiations free from the threat of industrial action.
Government Ministers and the airlines chorused “too little, too late!” A very contrived 
and calculated response. They never wanted a resolution involving the pilots and their union, 
the AFAP. They would not rest until the Federation was no more.
Early in their dispute, the companies were preparing the many versions of those private 
and non-negotiable individual contracts. Pilots who went in to the airlines were told the 
contracts were approved by the ACTU.
I would like to quote some clauses of an early contract:
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STAND DOW N
A. Notwithstanding anything elsewhere contained in this contract the employer may stand 
down without pay on any day or days a pilot who cannot in the absolute discretion of 
the employer be usefully employed.
A CCO M M O DATIO N AND T R A N SPO R T
The Standard of accommodation and transport will be determined by the employer.
H.QURS OF SERVICE
Pilots rostered for reserve duty will be on call at all times specified by the employer.
In short, key words in previous awards such as cooperate, consult, develop, consult 
regularly, pilot participation, most reasonable degree of stability and mutually agreed were 
replaced by employers’ requirements, as directed by the employer, and as deemed necessary or 
desirable.
The Department of Foreign Affairs seemed also to have a great interest. They reported 
back to Australia, prior to the forced resignations of pilots on 24th August, 1989, that their 
enquiries indicated many qualified pilots in South America available to come to Australia.
At the time when the pilots and the Federation were seeking to have the dispute resolved 
the companies, assisted by the Government, its Ministers and the ACTU were rejecting offers 
of a return to work while putting in place a network of measures designed to lock out pilots 
who wished to remain members of their union, the AFAP, and bring in a permanent 
replacement work force comprising of foreigners, a small number who had broken ranks, and 
some inexperienced light aircraft pilots.
Such action taken included:
• Cancellation of 40 years of agreement, in a few days;
• Suing individual pilots, their families and their union;
• Suing media commentators who spoke out on safety;
• Suing Civil Aviation Authority personnel who spoke out on safety;
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Threatening to confiscate superannuation;
• Refusing to negotiate with the pilots’ elected representatives;
• Refusing to accept a mediator in the dispute;
• Providing at least $100M of taxpayers’ money to assist the airlines;
« Promising $30M of taxpayers’ money for the “reconstruction” of the Tourist
Industry;
• Using the military to break an industrial dispute;
• Allowing foreign international aircraft to operate cabotage services;
• Bringing in foreign charter aircraft and crews to operate Australian domestic 
services;
• Bringing in a foreign permanent replacement work force for Australian citizens.
These actions were designed to destroy an Australian union, the Australian Federation 
of Air Pilots, a professional association, primarily responsible and internationally recognised 
for its role in making Australia the world's safest aviation country.
But why? Perhaps the companies and the Government saw the Federation and its pilots 
as a group, too independent, forthright and honest. Perhaps by wiping out the pilots’ 
organisation it would be a lesson for other individuals and groups in Australia to do as they 
were told by the Government, powerful vested interests and the ACTU, or that will happen to 
you. Perhaps they needed that to happen before deregulation.
Because the Federation is the most democratic union in Australia, and as repeated 
throughout the Dispute, the Federation is the members, the attack of the airlines and 
Government, with the help of the ACTU, was also an attempt to drive those men and women 
of integrity from their profession and their country.
They have not succeeded, but they continue. The pilots’ federation gained an injunction 
on 31st May, 1990, against the Immigration Department and the airlines to stop the import of 
foreign pilots to take the jobs of Australian citizens. On the 12th July, 1990, hidden amongst 
regulations covering Chinese students and Cambodian refugees, the Executive in Council, 
“shifted the goal posts”, and amended the migration regulations to give permanent residency to
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foreign pilots while one thousand three hundred Australian pilots were unemployed in 
Australia. I believe these regulation changes were an underhand way of bypassing the judicial 
system of Australia and a subversion of our Parliamentary system.
Australian Airlines received approval to import two Zimbabwean pilots on the 28th 
September, 1990 and they are seeking more.
The airlines are using every tactic possible not to employ their former pilots. Some 
pilots have been told they may apply for their jobs, but there will always be another more 
suitable applicant. So much for the high standards and years of experience that determined 
aviation safety.
Of the 1300 pilots and their families that remain unemployed in Australia some 800 have 
been forced overseas to continue their career. Most wish to return to live and work in Australia 
and be reunited with families back here. The rest are in the process of leaving Australia or 
picking up their careers with the new domestic operators, who are very keen to employ them. 
In the days ahead after Thursday , 1st November 1990, those new airlines will be able to claim 
the most experienced Australian pilots. Their reputation is their reference, simply the best.
What of the wage determination?
There never was one. After all the righteous outbursts from the airlines, Government 
and its Ministers, the ACTU and the AIRC, the foreigners and those others who joined them, 
received salary rises of between 40 and 100%. Salaries for airline pilots have been increased 
beyond their wildest dreams. The problem for management, the Government and the ACTU is 
that 1300 pilots and their families were not prepared to pay their price.
What of the union extermination?
A combination of the most abhorrent and anti-labour practices ever employed in the free 
world could not break the spirit, principle and integrity of over 80% of Australia’s domestic 
airline pilots and their families. In a country where mateship, and sticking by your mates is the 
quality most admired and respected, these are the people who have been put to that test, and 
passed.
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The ACTU now says direct negotiations and productivity offsets is the way to go, and 
the Government agrees. It seems the pilots and the AFAP were right all along.
Why was it necessary to use all that force?
There has been a servere loss of credibility to the Labour movement and an absolute 
bonus for the extreme conservatives who may use any and all of those draconian measures 
against those who encouraged, implemented and accepted it all.
The continuing dispute has shown up a Prime Minister not true to his reputation for 
consensus, conciliation and setdement. Instead he chose an aggressive, antagonistic attack on a 
group of dedicated professionals and their families.
Pilots now look forward to deregulation, and to working for and with those new airline 
companies which will start up and survive, because they will treat their staff as an asset. They 
will want to talk to them, and negotiate fair and equitable agreements. We are doing that now. 
You, their passengers will also realise and understand very quickly, that the very same attitude 
applies to you as a valued passenger and client.
b r i a n  M cC a r t h y , 
Melbourne, 1990.
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